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 NOTE 
Research in the Jury Room 
Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709 (Mo.) (en banc), reh’g 
denied, (Nov. 22, 2016) 
Ariel Monroe Kiefer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jury trials are fundamental to the American justice system.  Yet they are 
not perfect.  One serious problem arises when a juror performs independent 
research about the case.  This is unfair to the parties because the information 
the juror finds may be inadmissible under the rules of evidence and the party 
does not have a chance to explain or rebut the evidence.1  However, granting 
a new trial due to this misconduct is costly.  Trials are estimated to cost be-
tween approximately $20,000 and $70,000, depending on the subject matter 
of the case.2  It is difficult to determine how often juror misconduct occurs 
because jurors deliberate in secret and have limited contact with non-jurors.3  
When juror misconduct occurs, courts must determine if there should be a 
new trial by considering aspects like how much weight should be given to a 
juror’s testimony stating that extraneous information did not influence the 
juror’s decision. 
Part II of this Note discusses the facts surrounding the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s decision not to grant a new trial due to juror misconduct in Smo-
therman v. Cass Regional Medical Center.  Part III analyzes the approaches 
 
*B.S., Missouri State University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2018; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like to 
extend a special thank you to Professor Dessem and the entire Missouri Law Review 
staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. State v. Malone, 62 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Mo. 1933). 
 2.  PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, ESTIMATING THE COST OF 
CIVIL LITIGATION 7 fig.2 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.
ashx. 
 3. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Preventing Juror Misconduct in a Digital World, 90 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 983–84 (2015).  Additionally, there are few studies evaluat-
ing the frequency of juror misconduct.  One study found that ninety-four percent of 
federal judges are taking steps to address jurors’ social media use.  MEGHAN DUNN, 
JURORS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING TRIALS AND DELIBERATIONS 10 (Nov. 22, 
2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/DunnJuror.pdf.  The report focuses 
on social media use, but many of the preventative steps, such as confiscating electron-
ic devices and giving plain language explanations for the rules, would apply with 
equal force to juror research.  See id. at 8. 
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the Supreme Court of Missouri and Missouri appellate courts have taken 
when dealing with juror misconduct.  Part IV explains the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s rationale for denying a new trial.  Finally, Part V discusses why 
the Smotherman court should have granted a new trial and the techniques 
courts can use in the future to reduce the frequency of juror misconduct. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Kathrine Smotherman filed a lawsuit seeking damages against Cass Re-
gional Medical Center (“the Medical Center”) after she slipped and fell in the 
bathroom.4  Smotherman claimed that the soap dispenser was placed in such a 
way that it dripped on the floor, so she slipped on the soap and fell.5  The 
Medical Center argued that Smotherman’s slip was caused either by water on 
the bathroom floor or her preexisting knee problem.6  The jury returned a 
verdict for the Medical Center.7 
The controversy in this case arose after the initial trial.  Smotherman’s 
attorneys contacted several jurors after trial, and one of the jurors said that he 
researched the weather on the day of the accident.8  The juror found that there 
was “significant snowfall” in the forecast for that day.9  Therefore, Smother-
man moved for a new trial on the basis of extraneous juror research.10 
The Cass County Circuit Court held a hearing to determine whether it 
should grant Smotherman’s motion for a new trial.11  At the hearing, nine of 
the twelve jurors testified in camera.12  While Missouri follows the Mansfield 
Rule, which prevents jurors from giving testimony for the purpose of im-
peaching their verdict, an exception to the rule applies in this case.13  The 
exception allows a juror to testify about whether a juror gathered extraneous 
information about the case.14  In this case, the jurors were allowed to testify 
because they were testifying about another juror’s independent research about 
the weather on the day of the accident.15  One juror testified that the offend-
 
 4. Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 710 (Mo.) (en banc), 
reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 711–12. 
 7. Id. at 712. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 11CA-CV01257, 2014 WL 
10120320, at *1 (Cir. Ct. Cass Cty. Nov. 6, 2014), rev’d, No. WD 78111, 2015 WL 
6914974 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2015), rev’d en banc, 499 S.W.3d 709 (2016), reh’g 
denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 12. Id. at *1.  Three of the jurors were unavailable to attend the hearing for work 
related reasons or a previously scheduled vacation.  Id. at *1 n.1. 
 13. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 712. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
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ing juror only made one comment about the weather on the date of Smother-
man’s accident during deliberations.16  Several jurors testified that they did 
not remember hearing about the weather on the day of the accident, while 
other jurors did remember hearing about it.17  All of the non-offending18 ju-
rors testified that it was immaterial to their decisions, but the trial court found 
that the offending juror's research did influence his decision.19 
The trial court stated that even if juror testimony proves that a juror 
committed misconduct, a party is not necessarily entitled to a new trial.20  
Establishing that a juror committed misconduct only raises a “presumption of 
prejudice, and the burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut that presump-
tion.”21  Additionally, extraneous information only raises a presumption of 
prejudice if the extraneous information is “material” to the “consequential 
facts of the case.”22 
The Medical Center first argued that the extraneous information the ju-
ror acquired was not material; therefore, Smotherman was not prejudiced and 
a new trial should not be granted.23  It claimed the information was not mate-
rial because it was not relevant to the central issue of whether Smotherman 
slipped on soap.24  It also claimed that Smotherman presented so little evi-
dence that she slipped on soap that it was unlikely she was prejudiced.25  Fi-
nally, the Medical Center argued that the presumption of prejudice was rebut-
ted because the jurors testified that the information did not impact their deci-
sions.26  Smotherman argued that the extraneous information was material 
because it supported the Medical Center’s theory that something other than 
soap caused Smotherman to fall.27 
The trial court agreed with the Medical Center’s arguments and denied 
Smotherman’s motion for a new trial.28  The trial judge found the non-
 
 16. Smotherman, 2014 WL 10120320, at *2. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Non-offending jurors are jurors who did not engage in any misconduct.  See 
Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 713.  In this case, they are the jurors who did not conduct 
independent research.  See id. 
 19. Smotherman, 2014 WL 10120320, at *2; Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 717 
(Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 20. Smotherman, 2014 WL 10120320, at *1. 
 21. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 712 (citing Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 
2002) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
 22. Id. (citing State v. Stephens, 88 S.W.3d 876, 883–84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 23. Smotherman v. Cass Regl. Med. Ctr., No. WD 78111, 2015 WL 6914974, at 
*3 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2015), rev’d en banc, 499 S.W.3d 709 (Mo.), reh’g de-
nied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 712. 
 28. Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 11CA-CV01257, 2014 WL 
10120320, at *3 (Cir. Ct. Cass Cty. Nov. 6, 2014), rev’d, 2015 WL 6914974 (Mo. Ct. 
3
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offending jurors’ testimony to be credible.29  The trial court also found that 
the extraneous information the juror looked up was “immaterial.”30  The trial 
court instructed the jurors to find the Medical Center responsible only if they 
believed there was soap on the floor and the information about the weather 
“was cumulative to inferences as to other possible causes of the fall suggested 
during trial.”31  The trial court denied the motion for a new trial because the 
weight of the evidence presented at trial supported a finding for the Medical 
Center and it was unlikely Smotherman was prejudiced.32 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, reversed the trial 
court’s ruling.33  The court of appeals found that the information was material 
because it went to the central issue of what substance, if any, caused Smo-
therman’s fall.34  The appellate court did not give any weight to the fact that 
the information about the weather was only mentioned once in passing be-
cause the court relied on a prior case35 in which the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri granted a motion for a new trial when one juror obtained extraneous 
information and did not share it with any other jurors.36  Next, the court found 
that the “modest weight given to jurors’ claims that they were not affected by 
extrinsic evidence” was not enough to overcome the presumption of prejudice 
that is present when there is juror misconduct.37  Finally, the appellate court 
disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning that because Smotherman presented 
little evidence, it was unlikely she was prejudiced.38  The appellate court stat-
ed that because the trial court refused to grant the Medical Center’s motion 
for a directed verdict, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find for Smo-
therman.39  Therefore, Smotherman may have been prejudiced by the extra-
neous information.40  The case was then transferred to the Supreme Court of 
Missouri.41  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it found that the non-offending jurors’ testimony 
 
App. Nov. 10, 2015), rev’d en banc, 499 S.W.3d 709 (Mo.), reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 
2016). 
 29. Id. at *2. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at *2–3. 
 33. Smotherman, 2015 WL 6914974, at *6. 
 34. Id. at *4. 
 35. Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1 (2002) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 36. Smotherman, 2015 WL 6914974, at *5. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *5–6. 
 39. Id. at *5. 
 40. Id. at *6. 
 41. Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709 (Mo.) (en banc), reh’g 
denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
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that the extraneous information did not affect their deliberations rebutted the 
presumption of prejudice.42 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Missouri, jurors are generally not allowed to give testimony for the 
purpose of impeaching their verdict.43   This is called the Mansfield Rule.44  
The rule was originally adopted by Lord Mansfield in 1785 in the English 
case Vaise v. Delaval.45  The rule reflects the idea that litigants are entitled to 
a fair trial but not a perfect one.46  In fact, “[the Supreme] Court [of the Unit-
ed States] has long held that ‘[a litigant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a 
perfect one,’ for there are no perfect trials.”47  Additionally, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 61, regarding harmless error, prevents litigants from receiv-
ing a new trial when the court determines that the error did not affect their 
“substantial rights.”48 
There are four main rationales for the Mansfield Rule.49  The first is fi-
nality.50  If verdicts could be challenged every time a juror misunderstood the 
law or made an error in considering the evidence, a case might never end.51  
Second, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine how a jury under-
stood the law or thought about the evidence.52  Third, frequently reviewing 
verdicts based on allegations of juror misconduct could erode the public’s 
 
 42. Id. at 714–15.  If the court had granted the motion for a new trial, the case 
would have reverted back to the circuit court for a new trial.  Id. at 716. 
 43. Id. at 712.  The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this rule 
several times.  In March 2017, the Court held that where a juror makes a statement 
during deliberations indicating that he or she relied on racial animus to convict a de-
fendant, the Sixth Amendment requires Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to give way 
to permit the trial court to consider evidence of the juror’s statement.  Peña-Rodriguez 
v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); See also Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 
(2014) (holding Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a proceeding in which a 
party seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir dire).  
 44. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 712. 
 45. Jason R. Mudd, Note, Liberalizing the Mansfield Rule in Missouri: Making 
Sense of the Extraneous Evidence Exception After Travis v. Stone, 69 MO. L. REV. 
779, 782 (2004); Vaise v. Delaval (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B.). 
 46. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). 
 47. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 
223, 231–32 (1973)). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 61. 
 49. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 87–88. 
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confidence in the jury system.53  Last, impeaching jury verdicts might lead to 
harassment and threats against jurors by lawyers, the parties, or the public.54 
Initially, there was an exception to the Mansfield Rule in cases where 
life or liberty was at stake.55  However, that exception did not last long.56  
State v. Branstetter eliminated that exception when the court held that jurors 
could not testify about whether they had reached a quotient verdict in regard 
to the number of years the defendant should serve.57  Currently, there are two 
recognized situations where courts allow a juror to testify about juror mis-
conduct for the purpose of impeaching the verdict.  One exception is when 
there is an allegation that a juror showed severe racial bias during delibera-
tions.58  The other exception, the subject of this Note, arises when a juror 
gathers information outside the evidence presented at trial.59  While the sec-
ond exception is well established, it is still unclear what weight, if any, the 
court should give to juror testimony that the extraneous information did not 
influence their decisions. 
Many Missouri cases have considered what weight should be given to 
juror testimony about the effect of the extraneous information on their delib-
erations.  The weight of the juror’s testimony is important because it is an 
easy and common way for a party to rebut the presumption of prejudice that 
arises after juror misconduct.  The courts have not articulated a standard of 
proof for rebutting the presumption of prejudice and instead rely on precedent 
and fact-specific analysis.  Additionally, there is no bright-line rule regarding 
what weight the court must give juror testimony.  Generally, the court will 
decide whether to grant a new trial based on the type of extraneous infor-
mation,60 whether non-offending jurors testified that the information influ-
enced their decisions,61 the form of the juror’s testimony,62 the verdict the 
 
 53. James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States 
and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 389, 438 (1991). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Pratte v. Coffman, 33 Mo. 71, 78 (Mo. 1862) (stating in dicta that such an 
exception may apply but that it does not fit the case at hand). 
 56. State v. Branstetter, 65 Mo. 149, 156–57 (Mo. 1877). 
 57. Id. at 152, 156–57. 
 58. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 88, 90 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc) (holding that an evidentiary hearing should have been held when a juror ex-
pressed ethnic and religious bias against a Jewish party). 
 59. See id. at 88; Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per curi-
am).  Extraneous information is another term for information a juror obtains outside 
of trial.  See Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Mo.) (en 
banc), reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 60. See State v. Suschank, 595 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming 
judgment in case in which jurors looked up the word “reasonable” in a dictionary but 
stating that “not every case of misconduct by a jury requires a reversal”). 
 61. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 716. 
 62. See Middleton v. Kan. City Pub. Serv. Co., 152 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Mo. 
1941). 
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jurors reached,63 and any other factors the court finds relevant.64  Some Mis-
souri cases have granted a new trial based on juror testimony, while others 
have not. 
A.  Cases Granting a New Trial Based on Juror Testimony 
In Middleton v. Kansas City Public Service Co., a car and a streetcar 
were involved in an accident.65  A juror gathered extraneous information 
about the way the car and the streetcar were built.66  The plaintiff submitted 
similar affidavits from nine jurors saying that the extraneous information did 
not influence their decisions.67  The court granted a new trial because the trial 
court erred in placing the burden on the moving party to show that there was 
prejudice68 and because the court found that there was “little probative value 
[in the affidavit] because of the common tendency of jurors to minimize the 
effect of misconduct.”69 
Later, in Travis v. Stone, the Supreme Court of Missouri again held that 
a juror’s testimony stating that extraneous information did not influence her 
decision was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice.70  In that 
case, a juror improperly visited the accident site.71  The juror who committed 
the misconduct testified that the information did not affect her decision and 
that she did not share the information with other jurors.72  Other jurors did not 
testify.73  The court stated that “it must be assumed” that the juror’s extrane-
ous information impacted her decision, which may have influenced her par-
ticipation in the deliberations.74  The court granted a new trial because the 
extraneous information may have “subtly affected the outcome.”75 
B.  Cases Refusing to Grant a New Trial 
Several Missouri courts of appeals cases both before and after Travis 
and Middleton have reached a different conclusion.  In State v. Herndon, sev-
 
 63. State v. Herndon, 224 S.W.3d 97, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 64. See Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 711 (The trial court “is in the best position 
to determine what effect, if any, juror misconduct may have had on a jury’s verdict.”). 
 65. Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 155. 
 66. Id. at 156–57. 
 67. Id. at 157.  Twelve jurors tried the case, but only nine submitted affidavits.  
Id. at 160. 
 68. Id. at 159. 
 69. Id. at 160. 
 70. Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 5. 
 75. Id. 
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eral jurors used their cell phones during deliberations.76  One juror talked to 
the alternate juror, and the alternate said that she thought the victim was lying 
and the verdict should be not guilty.77  All of the other jurors testified that 
they did not hear the conversation, and the juror who had the conversation 
said it did not influence her decision.78  The court did not grant a new trial.79  
The court recognized that while the offending juror’s testimony should not be 
given much weight as to the effect of the misconduct, the verdict of guilty 
showed that the alternate’s suggestion that the jury should find the defendant 
not guilty did not persuade the jury.80  The court held that the presumption of 
prejudice was effectively refuted.81 
In other cases, Missouri courts have held that a new trial was not war-
ranted when juror misconduct did not lead to any new information.  In State 
v. Suschank, jurors looked up the definition of “reasonable” in a dictionary, 
but they testified that it did not influence their verdict.82  The court refused to 
grant a new trial because the definitions the jurors found were not different 
from their knowledge of the ordinary usage of the word.83  Additionally, in 
Consolidated School District No. 3 of Grain Valley v. West Missouri Power 
Co., a juror talked with another person about a technical aspect of the case.84  
The court did not grant a new trial because the juror did not share the infor-
mation with other jurors and the information was not contrary to the infor-
mation presented at trial.85  Ultimately, Missouri courts decide whether to 
grant a new trial when there is juror misconduct based on the specific facts of 
each case.  The court in Smotherman performs the same type of analysis but 
represents a new reluctance to grant new trials. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The majority opinion, written by Judge Mary R. Russell, held that Smo-
therman was not entitled to a new trial.86  Judge Richard B. Teitelman’s dis-
sent disagreed with the majority.87 
 
 
 76. State v. Herndon, 224 S.W.3d 97, 100–02 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 77. Id. at 101. 
 78. Id. at 102. 
 79. Id. at 103. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (“The unanimous guilty verdict refutes any contention that [an alternate 
juror’s] conversation with [a juror] influenced the jurors during deliberations.”). 
 82. State v. Suschank, 595 S.W.2d 295, 297–98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
 83. Id. at 298. 
 84. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. W. Mo. Power Co., 46 S.W.2d 174, 180 (Mo. 
1931). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 710 (Mo.) (en banc) 
reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 87. Id. at 716 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/10
2017] RESEARCH IN THE JURY ROOM 1203 
                                      A.  The Majority 
 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the non-offending jurors’ testimony, which suggest-
ed that the improper research did not influence their deliberations, successful-
ly rebutted the presumption of prejudice.88  Therefore, Smotherman was not 
entitled to a new trial.89  The Supreme Court of Missouri first considered 
whether prior cases dictated the outcome of this case.90  The court found that 
neither Travis nor Middleton prevented the trial court from relying in part on 
the non-offending jurors’ testimony.91  The court found that this case was 
distinguishable from Travis.92  This case was different because eight non-
offending jurors credibly testified that they either did not know about the 
research or that it did not affect their decisions, whereas in Travis, only the 
offending juror testified.93  Whether an offending or non-offending juror testi-
fies is important because courts have found non-offending juror testimony 
more credible.94  According to the court, this case was also distinguishable 
because the trial court in Travis did not explain its reasoning, whereas the 
trial court in this case wrote a thorough and well-reasoned opinion that 
showed that the trial court carefully considered the evidence and came to a 
logical and reasonable conclusion.95  The court also found that the Middleton 
precedent did not make it improper for the trial court to give weight to the 
non-offending jurors’ testimony.96  Here, the trial court heard live testimony 
from the jurors, whereas in Middleton the court merely received “form” affi-
davits.97  The court reasoned that since both Middleton and Travis were dis-
tinguishable from the case at hand, they did not control the outcome.98 
 
 88. Id. at 711 (majority opinion). 
 89. Id.  A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless “its ruling is clearly 
against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and 
unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful considera-
tion.”  Id. at 712 (citing Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo. 
2010) (en banc)). 
 90. Id. at 713–14. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 713. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 713, 715 (finding that “there is no logical reason to treat non-offending 
jurors as categorically less credible than all other witnesses,” and finding that it was 
proper for the trial court not to give any weight to the offending juror’s testimony); 
Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the 
lone testimony of the offending juror was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
prejudice). 
 95. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 713–14. 
 96. Id. at 714. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
9
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Last, the court considered whether the non-offending jurors’ testimony 
should be given any weight in this case.99  The court decided not to create a 
new rule requiring that no weight be given to non-offending jurors’ testimony 
for three main reasons.100  First, the court recognized that, generally, the trial 
court is in the best position to determine the credibility of a witness and de-
cide how much weight to give his or her testimony.101  The court reasoned 
that requiring a trial court to give jurors’ testimony little or no weight unnec-
essarily takes the power to determine credibility away from the trial court.102  
Second, the court found that leaving the trial court with broad discretion to 
decide a motion for a new trial when there was juror misconduct was sup-
ported by prior precedent.103  Third, the court stated that a rule mandating that 
no weight can be given to non-offending jurors’ testimony would effectively 
make the presumption of prejudice irrefutable.104  It would make it impossi-
ble for the trial court to believe jurors’ testimony that the extraneous infor-
mation did not affect their deliberations.105  Therefore, the presumption of 
prejudice would always stand, and the trial court would have to grant a new 
trial every time there was juror misconduct.106  Additionally, the court upheld 
the trial court’s decision that the information was immaterial because the 
verdict director only asked the jurors to find the Medical Center liable if they 
believed there was soap on the floor.107  The majority held that it was not an 
abuse of discretion to hold that the non-offending jurors’ testimony rebutted 
the presumption of prejudice.108 
B.  The Dissent 
The dissent believed that the Medical Center did not successfully rebut 
the presumption of prejudice created by the juror misconduct; therefore, a 
new trial should have been granted.109  According to the dissent, the trial 
court erred when it decided that the information the juror improperly re-
 
 99. Id. at 714–16. 
 100. Id. at 715–16. 
 101. Id. at 715. 
 102. Id.  The majority was also concerned that doing this would send the message 
that the court believed that jurors who acted properly and fulfilled their civic duty are 
not trustworthy.  Id. 
 103. Id. at 715–16 (citing Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. W. Mo. Power Co., 46 
S.W.2d 174, 180 (Mo. 1931); State v. Herndon, 224 S.W.3d 97, 100–03 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007); State v. Hayes, 637 S.W.2d 33, 38–39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. 
Suschank, 595 S.W.2d 295, 297–98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Hoffman v. Dunham, 202 
S.W. 429, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918)). 
 104. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 716. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 712–13. 
 108. Id. at 714–15. 
 109. Id. at 718 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
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searched was not material to the case.110  Information is material if “it has 
some logical connection with the consequential facts.”111  The dissent be-
lieved the information was material because “the possible existence of water 
on the floor has an obvious logical connection to the central disputed issue of 
what caused Plaintiff to slip and fall.”112 
The dissent next found error with the trial court’s evaluation of the ju-
rors’ testimony.113 Because jury deliberations are a collective process, the fact 
that the offending juror stated that his research influenced his decision com-
promised the deliberations even though eight other jurors said that it did not 
influence their decisions.114  The dissent also stated that the majority’s deci-
sion was inconsistent with Travis because Travis condemned independent 
factual research by jurors, stating it can “subtly affect[] the outcome of the 
case.”115  Additionally, in Travis, a new trial was granted when the offending 
juror did not share the information with other jurors, but here the information 
was shared.116  Therefore, the dissent found that it followed that the prejudi-
cial effect would be greater in this case.117  The dissent stated that the focused 
research in this case should be deemed prejudicial since the general research 
in Travis was deemed prejudicial.118  The dissent concluded that the prejudice 
was very high in this case and that the weight of the non-offending jurors’ 
testimony was not enough to overcome it; therefore, a new trial should have 
been granted.119 
V.  COMMENT 
This case represents a change in the way the Supreme Court of Missouri 
views juror testimony involving misconduct.  This Part discusses why the 
majority should have followed the dissent’s legal analysis, the competing 
policy considerations, and future approaches to guard against juror miscon-
duct. 
 
 110. Id. at 717. 
 111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Stephens, 88 S.W.3d 
876, 883–84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 112. Id.  The dissent further argued that the trial court’s finding that the extrane-
ous information was immaterial should have ended its analysis because immaterial 
evidence is not prejudicial.  Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (quoting Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per curi-
am)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 718. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
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A. The Majority’s Misapplication of the Legal Standard 
The majority should have adopted the dissent’s approach because the 
dissent made a logical and persuasive argument that the extraneous infor-
mation was material to the case and that the juror’s testimony should not have 
been given significant weight.  First, the majority should have followed the 
dissent’s approach in determining that the extraneous information was mate-
rial.  The dissent argued that the extraneous information was material because 
it supported the Medical Center’s theory of the case.120  Smotherman’s theory 
was that she slipped and fell on soap, and the Medical Center said she slipped 
for some other reason.121  The majority found that it was not material because 
the central issue was “whether there was soap on the bathroom floor.”122  
However, if the jurors thought it was likely that water was on the floor, they 
would be less likely to find for Smotherman by finding that soap was on the 
floor.123  In this case, that may have been what happened.  The juror found 
that there was significant snowfall on the day in question,124 so the jurors 
with whom the offending juror shared the weather information may have 
thought that it was likely that there was water on the bathroom floor from 
people tracking snow into the building.125  Therefore, the majority should 
have found that the extraneous information in this case supported the Medical 
Center’s theory and, consequently, was material. 
Second, the majority failed to recognize Smotherman’s similarities to 
past cases.  The dissent argued that the majority departed from past precedent 
when it upheld the trial court’s decision to give the jurors’ testimony substan-
tial weight and allow the testimony to rebut the presumption of prejudice.126  
The majority stated that Travis and Middleton did not dictate the result in this 
case.127  This case represents a break from the general direction of past cases.  
In both Travis and Middleton, the court granted a new trial because the ju-
rors’ testimony was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice.128  In 
Travis and Middleton, the jurors stated that the extraneous information did 
not influence their decisions.129  In Smotherman, at least one juror’s testimo-
ny was compromised because the offending juror stated that his research did 
 
 120. Id. at 717. 
 121. Id. at 711 (majority opinion). 
 122. See id. at 712–14. 
 123. See id. at 717 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 124. See id. at 712 (majority opinion). 
 125. See id. at 717 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 717–18. 
 127. Id. at 713–14 (majority opinion).  Both courts found that the juror’s testimo-
ny was not enough to rebut the presumption of prejudice and granted a new trial.  
Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam); Middleton v. Kan. 
City Pub. Serv. Co., 152 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Mo. 1941). 
 128. Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 2; Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 159–60. 
 129. Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 3; Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 160. 
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influence his decision, and he did share the information with the jury.130  Ad-
ditionally, in both Travis and Middleton, the offending jurors did not share 
the information with the other jurors, yet the court still found that their testi-
mony was insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice.131  Here, the 
other jurors’ testimony should have been even less reliable because the of-
fending juror did share the information with the jury.132  The fact that the 
majority found that the testimony of the non-offending jurors was sufficient 
to rebut the presumption of prejudice makes it more difficult for movants to 
obtain a new trial in cases of misconduct, which raises serious concerns about 
fairness. 
B. Policy Considerations 
There are many competing policy considerations the court must consider 
when deciding whether to grant a new trial based on juror misconduct, in-
cluding protecting jurors from harassment, maintaining the stability of ver-
dicts, establishing finality for the parties, and protecting the public’s trust in 
the jury system.  However, this Note focuses on two prominent considera-
tions: efficiency and the right to a fair trial.  Courts are not required to ana-
lyze these public policy arguments, yet they often do.133  This Part argues that 
fairness considerations outweigh efficiency concerns.  This Part also argues 
that fairness considerations dictate that juror testimony regarding whether 
extraneous information influenced his or her verdict be given little weight 
because this testimony has been proven unreliable in several studies. 
 
                                         1.  Efficiency 
 
Courts generally favor upholding jury verdicts.  As one Missouri court 
said, “Courts should not overturn a jury verdict lightly.  Trials are costly – for 
the litigants, the jurors and taxpayers.”134  In cases of juror misconduct, giv-
ing little weight to non-offending jurors’ testimony that the outside infor-
mation did not influence their verdict would increase the number of new trials 
and intensify the burden on everyone involved.  This is an important consid-
eration because the costs are very high.  The usual cost of a civil case, such as 
a premises liability case, is $54,000, with most of the cost coming from the 
 
 130. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 717 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 131. Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 3; Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 160. 
 132. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 712 (majority opinion); id. at 717 (Teitelman, J., 
dissenting). 
 133. See, e.g., Matlock v. St. John’s Clinic, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2012); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87–88 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc) (expressing the public policy consideration that trials should come to an end 
eventually and also pointing out that that there is no “legitimate way to corroborate or 
refute the mental process of a particular juror”). 
 134. Matlock, 368 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Keltner v. K-Mart Corp., 42 S.W.3d 
716, 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)). 
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trial itself.135  The cost to a juror of serving on a jury is high as well and rang-
es from $800 to $1000 per juror per day.136  The cost to the court is only 
about thirty dollars per juror per day, but the juror incurs lost wages, his or 
her employer loses productivity, and the juror’s day-to-day activities, such as 
childcare, are affected.137  All of these costs create a compelling policy reason 
to limit new trials.  However, limiting new trials could potentially deny citi-
zens the right to a fair trial. 
2.  A Fair Trial 
The right to a fair trial is fundamental.  Both the U.S. Constitution and 
the Missouri Constitution protect it by saying that “[n]o person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”138  In addi-
tion to being a fundamental right, fair trials are also important to society.  
Holding a fair trial has cathartic value for the parties and lets them air their 
grievances in front of a body that has the power to redress the wrong.139  
More importantly, fair trials are fundamental to maintaining order in society 
and holding the proper party accountable for its actions.140  The Missouri 
Constitution also gives parties the right to a jury trial in civil cases.141  The 
right to a jury trial includes the right to a fair and impartial jury.142  If any-
thing prevents the “fair and due consideration of the case” or if “the jury [re-
ceives] any evidence . . . not authorized by the court,” the court is authorized 
to grant a new trial.143 
In Smotherman, the trial was not fair because a member of the jury con-
ducted independent fact research.144  The court emphasized that parties are 
entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect trial.145  A juror conducting independ-
ent research and further sharing the information with other jurors is a serious 
 
 135. HANNAFORD-AGOR & WATERS, supra note 2, at 7 fig.2.  
 136. Am. Judicature Soc’y, Editorial, The Costs of Juries, 93 JUDICATURE 92, 128 
(2009). 
 137. Id. 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. V; accord MO. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 139. See Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principal of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. 
L. REV. 509, 534–35 (1988).  Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is substantially similar 
to the Mansfield rule.  See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
 140. The Right to a Fair Trial, DEFENDING HUM. RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL, 
https://www.fairtrials.org/about-us/the-right-to-a-fair-trial/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
 141. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).  The Seventh Amendment does the same in most 
federal court actions.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 142. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 143. MO. REV. STAT. § 547.020(1), (2) (2016). 
 144. See Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 710 (Mo.) (en 
banc), reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 145. Id. 
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threat to the fairness of the trial.  These acts are unfair because the jury is able 
to consider facts that the defendant does not have a chance to rebut or ex-
plain.146 
When the jury is exposed to extraneous information, the trial is no long-
er fair and the verdict is compromised even if the jurors testify that the infor-
mation did not influence their decisions.  This is partially because jurors may 
minimize the effect of their misconduct when testifying in front of the 
judge.147  First, jury deliberations are collaborative.148  In Smotherman, some 
jurors said that the information did not influence their decisions.149  However, 
one juror admitted that it did influence his decision and that would have in-
fluenced the way he participated in the deliberations.150  The juror’s altered 
participation may have “subtly affected the outcome of the case.”151  There-
fore, it must be assumed that the deliberations were compromised because it 
is impossible to show the degree to which the deliberations were altered or 
how they were altered.152 
Second, even though the non-offending jurors testified that the infor-
mation did not influence their decisions, it is impossible to know whether 
some extraneous fact may have unconsciously influenced the jurors’ deci-
sions.153  Studies show that information may influence a jury’s decision with-
out the jurors realizing it.154  For example, in a study where mock jurors were 
asked whether they thought the defendant was guilty after reading about dif-
ferent pieces of evidence, the mock jurors were likely to find subsequent in-
formation more incriminating after they heard a credible piece of information 
they found very incriminating.155  This shows that jurors are generally not 
able to discern which pieces of information impacted their decision.156  Other 
studies show that “[p]eople often cannot report accurately on the effects of 
particular stimuli on higher order, inference-based responses.”157  In several 
studies, the participants were not able to discern whether a certain stimulus 
 
 146. See State v. Malone, 62 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Mo. 1933). 
 147. Middleton v. Kan. City Pub. Serv. Co., 152 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Mo. 1941). 
 148. Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 717 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per curi-
am)). 
 152. Id. (citing Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 5). 
 153. See State v. Malone, 62 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Mo. 1933). 
 154. Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions 
to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1051 (1997). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can 
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 233 (1977). 
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had an effect on their behavior.158  Even when the participants were asked if 
they believed a certain stimulus affected their behavior, they stated that they 
did not believe it had affected their behavior even though the statistical data 
in a controlled experiment showed that it had caused their behavior.159  A 
juror’s testimony that extraneous information did not influence his or her 
decision should not receive substantial weight based on this data.160 
C.  Preventing Juror Misconduct 
Preventing juror misconduct would prevent costly appeals, decrease the 
frequency of new trials, and increase trial fairness.  Currently, Missouri at-
tempts to prevent juror misconduct though jury instructions.161  The Missouri 
Approved Instructions tell jurors that they may not “conduct any independent 
research . . . [by] the use of the Internet.”162  The instructions also explain 
why it is important for jurors to follow these rules.163  The rules state that “[i]t 
would be unfair to the parties to have any juror influenced by information that 
has not been allowed into evidence in accordance with those rules of evidence 
and procedure.”164  Additionally, the rules tell the jurors that a new trial may 
be necessary if the jurors break the rules.165  These instructions sufficiently 
explain the legal reasons a juror should not conduct independent research, but 
they might be confusing to a juror who is not familiar with legal procedures.  
In Smotherman, they failed to prevent juror misconduct.166  Therefore, courts 
might benefit from trying new techniques of preventing juror misconduct. 
Enacting penalties may help prevent juror misconduct.  Some judges 
have enacted fines.167  Some fines are $250, while others can be the entire 
 
 158. Id. at 237–38.  In one of the studies, participants took a placebo pill before 
bed.  Id. at 237.  Half of the participants were told that the pill would relax them, the 
other half were told it would excite them.  Id. at 237–38.  There was a significant 
difference in the time it took each group to fall asleep as compared to their base line, 
yet none of the participants believed the change in how long it took them to fall asleep 
was due to the placebo pill.  Id. at 238. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Contra Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Mo.) (en 
banc), reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016).  However, giving juror testimony less weight 
due to the research regarding the unconscious effect evidence may have on a juror’s 
mind and the difficulty people have with determining which stimuli led them to a 
certain decision would likely lessen the insulting effect. 
 161. See MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 2.01(8) (7th ed.). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Mo.) (en 
banc), reh’g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 167. See David P. Goldstein, Current Development, The Appearance of Impropri-
ety and Jurors on Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with Ju-
ror Misconduct, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 600 (2011). 
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cost of the retrial.168  The harsh fine may be justified if the misconduct is so 
severe that it warrants a mistrial.169  Some people even believe criminal 
charges are warranted for juror misconduct.170  Some countries, such as Aus-
tralia, have taken this approach.171 
However, there are downsides to enacting penalties.  Self-reporting is 
one of the primary ways courts discover juror misconduct.172  If there are 
severe penalties, jurors will be far less likely to report misconduct by other 
jurors if they know that the other juror will be in serious trouble.173  Addi-
tionally, citizens generally do not want to serve on a jury, and severe penal-
ties will discourage citizens even further from performing this civic duty.174 
Another alternative is that judges could confiscate jurors’ electronic de-
vices during the trial and deliberations.175  Jurors would be unable to access 
the Internet during the day, and it might reduce a juror’s urge to look up in-
formation because the juror might forget about it when the juror leaves court 
for the day.176  However, since jurors are not in court all of the time, judges 
cannot confiscate all devices they might encounter, and further, judges cannot 
control jurors’ access to information outside the courtroom.177 
A better option requires educating the jurors.  Simply telling jurors not 
to research information about the case one time during the trial, as was done 
in Smotherman, is likely not enough.178  A judge could explain in plain lan-
guage why the rule against independent research is in place.  This is the most 
popular option among federal judges who are trying to prevent jurors from 
using social media.179  If the jurors have a better understanding of why they 
are not allowed to do research and the consequences for the parties if they 
violate the rules, they will be more likely to follow the rules.180  Additionally, 
judges can restate the instruction before voir dire, after voir dire, and before 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Hoffmeister, supra note 3, at 982. 
 172. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 600. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 601. 
 175. Id. at 599. 
 176. See id. at 599–600. 
 177. See id. 
 178. The jury was told not to conduct Internet research, yet a juror did so anyway.  
Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Mo.) (en banc), reh’g 
denied, (Nov. 22, 2016). 
 179. DUNN, supra note 3, at 8 tbl.8.  62.4% of the judges used this technique.  Id.  
This study focused on jurors’ social media use, but the same concepts can be applied 
to jurors’ Internet research.  See id. at 1. 
 180. Ralph Artigliere et. al., Reining in Juror Misconduct, 84 FLA. B.J. 8, 14 
(2010). 
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the jury begins deliberating.181  A judge could also post a sign with the in-
struction in the jury room.  Since many jurors have not served on a jury be-
fore and many of the instructions can seem confusing, repeating the instruc-
tion banning independent research will help jurors remember the rule.  How-
ever, there are still problems with this strategy.  For example, the jurors may 
wonder what is being kept from their knowledge.  To ensure that jurors do 
follow the rules, the judge can encourage jurors to notify the judge if they see 
another juror conducting research, and court personnel can keep an eye on the 
jurors to make sure they are not using their phones during the trial.  While 
there is no perfect way to prevent juror misconduct, courts can take these 
preventative measures to reduce its frequency. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Juror misconduct is a serious problem.  When it happens, it costs every-
one involved money and undermines the fairness of the trial.  In Smotherman, 
the court dealt with the aftermath of juror misconduct and had to decide 
whether to grant a new trial.182  The court did not consider that the jury might 
use the information to determine what substance was on the bathroom floor; 
therefore, it erroneously found that the information was not material.183  Ad-
ditionally, the court gave significant weight to non-offending jurors’ testimo-
ny that extraneous information did not impact their decisions,184 and in doing 
so, this case broke from the past precedent of Travis and Middleton.185 
The court did not adequately consider the public policy repercussions of 
denying Smotherman a new trial.  Two relevant policy considerations are 
efficiency of the court system and fairness to the parties.  Fairness to the par-
ties is the weightier consideration here because parties have a fundamental 
right to a fair trial.  However, deciding whether to further the policy goal of 
fairness or efficiency is difficult.  In the future, courts should take more pre-
ventative measures to reduce the instances of juror misconduct.  One effective 
preventative measure is educating the jury about why they should not conduct 
independent research and reminding them of that rule often.  Preventing juror 
misconduct is vital in limiting costly new trials and stopping instances where 
citizens are denied the right to a fair trial. 
 
 181. DUNN, supra note 3, at 8 tbl.8.  53.3% of federal judges chose this option.  
Id. 
 182. See Smotherman, 499 S.W.3d at 710. 
 183. See id. at 717 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 184. See id. at 715 (majority opinion). 
 185. See id. at 717–18 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
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